Apollomics raised $233 million from private investors. Those shares are worth $12.7 million today.
This is what happened to that money, whether anyone was protected, who owns the company now, and what is actually left to own. Every number comes from a filing.
1. Why they are down
Four private rounds, all priced in the annual report. Because the filing restates historic share counts for the 100:1 reverse split of 2024-11-14, these compare directly to today's quote.
| Round | When | Paid then | Same price after the split | Raised | Today |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Series A1 | 2016, 2019 | $0.634 | $63.38 | $6.0M | -63% |
| Series A2 | 2017 | $0.713 | $71.30 | $3.8M | -67% |
| Series B | 2018 to 2019 | $4.644 | $464.43 | $99.0M | -95.0% |
| Series C | 2020 | $6.759 | $675.93 | $124.3M | -96.5% |
A Series B investor paid $4.64 a share in 2018. A hundred of those shares later became one. So the comparable cost today is $464.43, against a $23.40 close on 2026-08-14.
The reverse split did not cause this. A split is arithmetic: a hundred shares become one worth a hundred times more, and nobody's position changes value that afternoon. The split is what a company does after a collapse, to keep its share price above the exchange minimum. The collapse is the thing that destroyed the money.
2. What actually went wrong
Apollomics spent $233 million assembling a pipeline of in-licensed cancer drugs. Between 2024 and 2025 most of it was written off or handed back.
| Programme | What happened |
|---|---|
| APL-106 (uproleselan, from GlycoMimetics) | Phase 3 in relapsed/refractory AML missed its primary endpoint. Full carrying value written off: a $10.0 million impairment |
| APL-810 (from TYG) | Licence terminated as pipeline prioritisation, November 2024 |
| APL-122 (EO1001, from Edison) | Licence terminated 2025-12-11, the company citing Edison's "systematic failure to provide clinical reports" and to give contractually mandated data access |
By August 2025 the money was gone. The company announced it would discontinue its lead trial and wind up. Nasdaq moved to delist it on 2025-09-18 under Rule 5101, on the view that it "had become a public shell devoid of an operating business."
That is the bottom. Everything after it is the recovery.
3. Did anyone see it coming, and was anyone protected?
Yes to both, and this is the part nobody covering this stock mentions.
Private investors in these rounds hold preferred shares, and preferred shares carry protections ordinary shares do not. Apollomics' carried redemption rights: the right to demand the company buy the shares back.
Two of them tried to use it.
- December 2022. Two minority investors, the TWVC Entities, formally requested redemption of their preferred shares, weeks before the SPAC merger closed.
- March 2023. Shareholders approved the merger with Maxpro. That vote cancelled all private preferred share rights and converted every preferred share into ordinary shares. The redemption request went with them.
- July 2024. Their investment manager issued a Writ in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, case FSD 266 of 2024, seeking roughly $13.0 million in redemption proceeds and arguing they were creditors rather than shareholders.
- November 2025. The company settled, via a Confidential Schedule to a Tomlin Order: $5.0 million in cash across four instalments over 24 months, split $4,175,000 to TWVC Goldlink and $825,000 to TWVC Panglin, plus about $0.9 million in legal costs. TWVC withdrew all claims and confirmed they are ordinary shareholders.
So the silver lining exists, and it is narrow. Two investors recovered $5.9 million by litigating. Every other preferred holder was converted alongside them and got nothing beyond the shares.
It also matters to anyone buying today, because that settlement is not history. $5.9 million is payable out of a company that held $3.3 million in cash. Of the $8.0 million raised in August, most is already committed to a dispute that predates the current board.
4. Who owns it now, and what they paid
Three financings in eleven months rebuilt the shareholder base at prices nothing like the ones above.
| Financing | Date | Price | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| PIPE | 2025-09-03 | $3.9317 | 1.04M shares, $4.1M. The money that reversed the wind-up |
| CEO convertible note | 2026-03-30 | $12.00 at conversion | $2.0M, unsecured, 0% interest, converting at 80% of the next round |
| Private placement | 2026-08-14 | $15.00 | 533,334 shares, $8,000,010 cash |
Officers and directors put $2,250,005 of their own cash into the August round.
| Buyer | Role | Shares | Cash |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hung-Wen (Howard) Chen | Chairman and CEO | 370,000 | $1,549,995, plus his $2.0M note converting at $12.00 |
| Peter Kuan-How Lin | Chief Financial Officer | 26,667 | $400,005 |
| Maxpro Investment Co. | affiliate of COO and director Yi-Kuei (Alex) Chen | 20,000 | $300,000 |
| Unaffiliated investors | 283,344 |
Both halves of the chief executive's position are true at once. He lent the company $2 million unsecured, at zero interest, while it carried a going-concern warning. He also converted it at a 20% discount to what outside investors paid in the same round.
They cannot sell quickly. Those shares were issued unregistered under Regulation D, so Rule 144 is the only route out: a six-month hold, reaching roughly 2027-02-14, and then an affiliate cap of about 28,960 shares a quarter. At that cap, the chief executive's 370,000 shares would take around three years to sell.
This is also what moved the stock. The placement closed on or about 2026-08-14. That is the day $APLM closed at $23.40, up 34.7%. A round priced at $15.00 settling into a $23.40 market explains the session better than anything about float.
5. What is actually left to own
This is the question the price is really about, and the answer is narrower than the collapse suggests but not empty.
Vebreltinib (APL-101) is an oral inhibitor of c-Met, a receptor that is mutated or amplified in several cancers. It is already approved in China under conditional approval, sold there by partner Avistone, and it carries US orphan drug designation for NSCLC with MET aberrations.
The competitive picture decides everything:
| Indication | Approved drugs | Apollomics |
|---|---|---|
| NSCLC, MET Exon 14 skipping | capmatinib, tepotinib (US, Japan, EU); savolitinib, gumarontinib, vebreltinib (China) | five competitors, only 3-4% of NSCLC |
| NSCLC, c-Met amplification | none, anywhere | the only cohort still enrolling |
| Solid tumours, c-Met fusions | none | following existing patients only |
A company with $3.3 million has stopped enrolling the crowded indication and put everything into c-Met amplification, where no drug is approved anywhere in the world. Read as triage that is a retreat. Read as strategy it is the one cohort where arriving late costs nothing.
Supporting evidence exists: a randomised Phase 2/3 in China in recurrent glioblastoma with PTPRZ1-MET fusions reported a 48% reduction in the risk of death against an active comparator. Over 600 patients have been dosed with vebreltinib to date. A Phase 1 combination with osimertinib in EGFR-mutant lung cancer is running.
And Apollomics is not paying for all of it. A second pivotal Phase 2 study, KUNPENG, is run by partner Avistone in China. Two registrational studies are advancing the same molecule while Apollomics funds one of them.
And there are three assets most coverage ignores. All are partner-dependent by design, because the company states outright that its strategy is to find partners rather than fund them:
- APL-502 (TQB-2450), an anti-PD-L1 antibody developed by partner CTTQ, is already approved by China's NMPA for three indications: extensive-stage small cell lung cancer, recurrent or metastatic endometrial cancer, and advanced renal cell carcinoma. Trials continue in seven more tumour types.
- APL-501, an anti-PD-1 antibody. Phase 1 data in solid tumours currently being analysed.
- APL-801, a cancer vaccine, preclinical.
An approved drug in China with a funded partner is a real asset on a balance sheet this small. It is also not one Apollomics controls.
6. The money, honestly
| 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash used in operations | $43.2M | $28.7M | $10.4M |
| Cash at year end | $32.1M | $9.8M | $3.3M |
The burn is down 76% in two years, at 14 full-time employees. That is the most encouraging line in the filings: $8 million now buys far more time than $8 million would have bought in 2023.
It is still not enough by the company's own account. The report carries a going-concern warning and says resources are "not sufficient to meet our obligations as they come due within the assessment period through April 30, 2027." Against that sit the $5.9 million TWVC settlement, a $2.3 million receivable from partner LaunXP whose payment schedule depends on LaunXP completing its own fundraising, and active litigation with former contract research organisation Medpace, which sued in May 2025 and against which Apollomics has counterclaimed for over $2.0 million.
7. What to watch
- Cash at 2026-06-30 in the next interim report, against $3.3 million at year end.
- The TWVC instalments, $5.9 million over 24 months, and what is left of the August raise after them.
- SPARTA enrolment reopening beyond c-Met amplification. That would signal the cash constraint easing.
- Any read-out or partnering deal on APL-501, whose Phase 1 data is being analysed now.
- Form 144 filings from around 2027-02-14, the first date August's restricted shares can move.
- The next raise. Three rounds took the count from 1.1 million to roughly 2.9 million shares in sixteen months. A fourth is likelier than not.
This is not advice and it is not a view on the price. The company was weeks from closing a year ago. The people who rescued it paid $3.93, $12.00 and $15.00 for the right to try, and cannot sell for six months. What they bought is one Phase 2 cohort in an indication nobody has cracked, a partner-approved drug in China they do not control, and a balance sheet their own auditors have flagged.