APLM part two: going concern, and a CEO lending his own company money

In part one we corrected our own float number and then stopped, because our SEC access was returning 403 and we would not guess at the half we could not read. That access is working again. Here is the half we owed you.

Everything below comes from the annual report Apollomics filed on 2026-04-24 for the year ended 2025-12-31, and from a Schedule 13D/A filed on 2026-08-14.

First, the reader was right and we were the ones who were wrong

The reply that started this said the small share count came from a 100:1 reverse split. It did.

In connection with a reverse stock split of 100-to-1 effective on November 14, 2024, all shares and notes thereto have been retroactively adjusted for all periods presented.

And our 1.1 million figure was not invented, which is the part we could not explain in part one. It was real, and a year stale. The share count on each annual report:

There is the 1.1 million. It is the post-split count from the FY2024 report, filed in April 2025. By the following annual report the count had very nearly doubled.

That is the dilution question answered, and it is answered against us: we quoted a share count without checking its date, in a post about how thin the share count was. It is the same failure as quoting a float without its denominator, one shelf along.

The financial position, stated plainly by the company

The going-concern language is not our characterisation. It is theirs:

Based on our evaluation of conditions and events as of December 31, 2025, management has determined that substantial doubt exists about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern. As of that date, we had cash and cash equivalents of $3.3 million, a history of recurring losses and negative shareholders' equity, and limited liquidity relative to our operating requirements.

And on how long that lasts:

our existing cash resources are not sufficient to meet our obligations as they come due within the assessment period through April 30, 2027.

The burn tells a more complicated story than the cash balance alone, and it is the one genuinely encouraging number in the filing.

$43.2 million, then $28.7 million, then $10.4 million. The company has cut its cash consumption by 76% in two years and is down to 14 full-time employees. At the 2025 rate, $3.3 million is roughly four months. At the 2023 rate it would have been under a month.

What has been keeping the lights on

Three things, and none of them is revenue.

The PIPE. $4.1 million, closed 2025-09-03. New board, then new management, then the wind-down was reversed.

The chief executive's own money. This is the detail that changes how the rest reads:

Subsequent to year-end, our liquidity was further supported by a $2.0 million unsecured convertible bridge loan provided by our Chairman and CEO, Mr. Hung-Wen (Howard) Chen, on March 30, 2026.

Unsecured, from the CEO personally, and convertible. Convertible means it can become shares. A company funded by a convertible loan from its own chairman has a supply question that no float number will show you, because those shares do not exist yet.

A receivable that has not fully arrived. Apollomics licensed rights to LaunXP International for $10 million in upfront payments. As of 2025-12-31, $6.2 million had been paid. The company issued a notice of breach in July 2025 over the delay. Of the remaining $3.8 million, $2.3 million is booked as a receivable and $1.5 million is not yet billed, and the revised payment schedule is contingent on LaunXP completing its own capital raise.

So the largest near-term inflow depends on a third party raising money.

Nasdaq tried to delist it, and said why

This did not appear in any of the coverage we saw.

On September 18, 2025, we received a formal notification letter from the Listing Qualifications Staff of The Nasdaq Stock Market indicating their determination to delist our securities under Nasdaq Listing Rule 5101. The Staff's determination was predicated on their belief that the Company had become a public shell devoid of an operating business.

The company disputed it and appealed, which stayed the trading suspension. After the PIPE closed and the new leadership arrived, Nasdaq confirmed compliance on 2025-10-14, which is the same date as the press release we quoted in part one.

So the "operational continuity update" everyone read as good news was, in its full context, the resolution of a delisting fight the company had been losing three weeks earlier.

The pipeline, from the filing rather than from memory

We refused to characterise this in part one without the documents. With them:

APL-101 (vebreltinib) is in a global Phase 2 trial known as SPARTA, in solid tumours with c-Met alterations, partnered with Avistone. In late August 2025 the previous management announced the expected discontinuation of all SPARTA activities because of severe cash constraints. After the September PIPE, that decision was reversed and the trial continues.

The company states that more than 600 patients and 170 healthy volunteers have been dosed with vebreltinib across its trials to date.

Separately, and worth knowing because it is the kind of thing a headline skips: Apollomics recorded a $10.0 million impairment, writing the full carrying value of an intangible asset to zero, after negative Phase 3 results from GlycoMimetics on a different program.

The filing from the day of the move

On 2026-08-14, the day $APLM closed up 34.7%, a Schedule 13D/A was filed by Yi-Kuei Chen, of Taipei, reporting 145,171 shares, or 4.97% of the class. The position includes 121,248 shares held by Maxpro Investment Co., the entity connected to the SPAC that took Apollomics public, and Mr Chen is a director of Maxpro.

Two things are worth noticing without over-reading them.

4.97% is just under the 5% reporting threshold. A holder crossing below 5% is exactly when a final amendment gets filed.

The implied share count does not match ours. 145,171 shares reported as 4.97% implies roughly 2.92 million shares outstanding, while our own record says 2,196,052 as of 2026-07-31 and the April annual report agreed. Either the count has grown by another third since April, or the filer used a different denominator. We do not know which, and the difference is exactly the kind of thing that makes a percentage worthless without its base.

So, are the early investors underwater

Yes, almost certainly, and it is the wrong question. A 100:1 reverse split in November 2024 followed by a near-doubling of the share count tells you what happened to anyone who held through it.

But part one already showed there is no large restricted block waiting to be released. Institutions hold 0.49%. The float is 91% to 99% of the company. Whatever those Seed through Series C investors are feeling, they are not the supply overhang, because they are largely not here.

The supply that matters is the supply that does not exist yet: a convertible loan from the chairman, warrants that the company itself says may expire worthless, and a company that has stated in writing it needs more capital than it has.

What we would watch, and what this is not

This is not advice and it is not a view on the price. It is the list of things that would actually change the picture:

1. The next interim report, for cash at 2026-06-30. The $3.3 million figure is from December and the company has told you it is not enough.
2. Whether the LaunXP $2.3 million arrived in Q2 2026 as proposed, since it depends on somebody else's fundraising.
3. What happens to the CEO's $2.0 million convertible loan. Repaid is one story. Converted is a different one, and it is dilution.
4. Any use of the shelf. A registration statement went effective on 2026-06-02, which is the mechanism by which new shares reach the market.
5. SPARTA readouts, and whether Phase 2 continues to be funded.
6. The share count on every future filing. It went from 1,103,348 to 2,196,052 in twelve months. That is the single number this whole story keeps coming back to.

Part one corrected a float. This part corrects the impression that the float was the interesting number. It was not. The interesting numbers are $3.3 million, a going-concern paragraph, and a chief executive lending his own company money six weeks before the annual report.